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The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils 
of Ad Hoc Balancing 
Jules Lobel† 
The Bush administration’s response to the September 11 
attacks has been characterized by a paradigm shift in fighting 
terrorism: from a defensive to offensive strategy, from reliance 
on deterrence to a new emphasis on preemption, from back-
ward to forward-looking measures, and from prosecution to 
prevention.1 At the heart of this shift is what Attorney General 
John Ashcroft termed the “new . . . paradigm of prevention.”2 
The Bush administration has invoked this sweeping new pre-
ventive paradigm to justify the coercive use of state power to 
preventively detain suspected terrorists, to engage in extraor-
dinary rendition of suspects to foreign states, to interrogate de-
tainees, and to go to war against Iraq.3 While the traditional 
rules of both international and domestic law prevent a state 
from using physical force against an individual or another na-
tion except in response to some demonstrable wrongdoing, the 
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draws upon a larger book project, co-authored with Professor David Cole, enti-
tled Less Safe, Less Free: The Failure of Preemption in the War on Terror 
(forthcoming New Press 2007). Any mistakes or errors are, of course, my own, 
as are any views expressed in this Article. I wish to thank my research assis-
tant Sarah Vuong for her research help with this Article and the staff of the 
Document Technology Center at the University of Pittsburgh for their invalu-
able assistance in preparing this Article. Copyright © 2007 by Jules Lobel. 
 1. DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: THE FAILURE OF 
PREEMPTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming New Press 2007) (manu-
script at 1, on file with authors). 
 2. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks Before the 
Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj 
.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm (“In or-
der to fight and to defeat terrorism, the Department of Justice has added a 
new paradigm to that of prosecution—a paradigm of prevention.”). 
 3. See infra Part I. 
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new preventive paradigm allows the state to use such coercive 
power to prevent possible wrongdoing in the future.4 
The shift to prevention has shaped the administration’s re-
sponse to terrorism in a wide variety of domestic and interna-
tional contexts. Domestically, the Justice Department now 
views the prevention of future terrorist acts as “even ‘more im-
portant than prosecution’ [of] past crimes.”5 Similarly, in for-
eign policy, the National Security Strategy announced a “new 
doctrine called preemption,”6 which states that we are living in 
a “new world”7 where the U.S. “can no longer solely rely on a 
reactive posture as . . . in the past.”8 The National Security 
Strategy maintained that in order to prevent a future attack, 
the United States could initiate warfare unilaterally even when 
it neither had been attacked nor faced a threat of imminent at-
tack.9 In the name of preventing future attacks, the admini-
stration detained thousands of individuals without trial, the 
vast majority of whom were never even charged with commit-
ting a terrorist crime.10 The administration has justified its use 
of coercive interrogation tactics against detainees and its estab-
lishment of secret CIA prisons, which house allegedly high-
value al Qaeda suspects, by asserting the necessity of prevent-
ing future terrorist attacks.11 The administration has trans-
formed the practice of extraordinary rendition from a mecha-
nism used to transfer accused criminals to a country where 
they would face trial to a preventive technique whereby sus-
pects are sent to third countries not to try them for crimes they 
allegedly committed, but to torture and preventively detain 
them without charge in order to obtain information to prevent 
future crimes.12 
 
 4. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5). 
 5. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 
3 (2006) (quoting Curt Anderson, Ashcroft Cites “Monumental Progress” in 
U.S. War on Terrorism, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 13, 2003).  
 6. Remarks at a Reception for Governor Rick Perry of Texas in Houston, 
1 PUB. PAPERS 990, 994 (June 14, 2002). 
 7. George W. Bush, Introduction to WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECU-
RITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. 
 8. Id. at 15. 
 9. Id. 
 10. David Cole, Are We Safer?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 9, 2006, at 15, 17. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely 
Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, § 1, at 1 (“[Rendition is the] 
Bush administration’s secret program to transfer suspected terrorists to for-
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The adoption of this preventive model in both domestic and 
foreign affairs is closely linked to the President’s assertion of 
inherent executive power and to the executive branch’s reliance 
on military force and war powers to fight its war on terror. 
Critics of the Bush administration have argued that the ad-
ministration has asserted unprecedented views of unchecked, 
inherent executive authority to fight terrorism, and these crit-
ics have claimed that the expansion of executive power under-
lies the war on terror.13 Few, however, have noted the close re-
lationship between the administration’s expansive view of 
executive power and its adoption of a coercive preventive para-
digm. Yet, the Bush administration justifies its assertion of 
sweeping executive authority by claiming the need to use coer-
cive preventive strategies. Indeed, immediately after Septem-
ber 11, top White House lawyers agreed “‘that [the administra-
tion] had to move from retribution and punishment to 
preemption and prevention. Only a warfare model allows that 
approach.’”14 
The turn toward prevention is not surprising. When faced 
with potential terrorist threats, it makes sense to focus efforts 
on preventing future attacks, as opposed to merely punishing 
those who have attacked the United States. Preventive diplo-
matic, law enforcement, and security measures are crucial to 
U.S. security, just as preventive medicine is important to one’s 
physical wellbeing. What is problematic about the administra-
tion’s preventive paradigm is not its preventive focus, but the 
state’s reliance on the preventive use of physical force against 
individuals or nations in circumstances where traditional law 
normally prohibits such use. Instead of focusing on preventive 
measures like increased port security or monitoring terrorist 
funding, both of which have been underfunded by this admini-
stration,15 the executive has emphasized coercive prevention. In 
pursuit of this aim, the administration has deployed physical 
and military force to detain suspected terrorists, to kidnap and 
send individuals to nations that will detain and likely torture 
them, to engage in coercive interrogations, and to go to war 
 
eign countries for interrogation . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME 554 (2004). 
 14. Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 44, 51 
(quoting Associate White House Counsel Bradford Berenson). 
 15. Mathew Brzezinski, Red Alert, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 39, 
94. 
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against nations that it believes pose a future threat.16 Of 
course, a state may use force against individuals or other na-
tions in circumstances narrowly prescribed by the rule of law.17 
A function of the preventive paradigm is to nullify those pro-
scriptions in the name of prevention. 
The preventive paradigm was making disturbing inroads 
into traditional notions of preventing harmful conduct even 
prior to September 11. Some scholars have argued that democ-
ratic societies are experiencing a basic shift in their approach 
to controlling harmful behavior, moving from a traditional reli-
ance on deterrence and backward-looking reactions toward a 
more preventive and forward-looking approach.18 Professor 
Paul Robinson has observed that over the past few decades, the 
criminal justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past 
violations to preventing future crimes by means of a system of 
preventive detention.19 Americans’ increased fear of crime has 
made the criminal justice system more receptive to the preven-
tive rationale.20 September 11 dramatically escalated Ameri-
cans’ fears and insecurities, leading to greater acceptance of the 
preventive rationale in the war on terror. 
The Bush administration’s argument for the adoption of a 
new preventive paradigm is based on the threat of a potentially 
catastrophic attack.21 In a variety of settings, the administra-
tion and its supporters pose worst-case hypotheticals to justify 
highly coercive preventive measures. For example, they often 
invoke the ticking bomb scenario to justify preventive torture; 
they argue that if a suspect is known to have planted a bomb in 
a building, the only way to prevent thousands of people being 
killed is to torture the suspect. So too, in the run up to the pre-
ventive war against Iraq, President Bush invoked the specter of 
nuclear attack: “America must not ignore the threat gathering 
against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for 
the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of 
 
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42, 51. 
 18. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 2. 
 19. Paul Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking 
Preventive Detentions as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 
(2001). 
 20. See id. at 1433–34 (“[P]olitical forces inevitably will press for protec-
tive measures if a perception of public vulnerability exists . . . . [I]t is under-
standable that today’s citizens are demanding greater protection and that leg-
islators are seeking new ways to provide it.”). 
 21. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 13. 
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a mushroom cloud.”22 And when administration supporters ar-
gue in favor of preventive detention, they ask what the gov-
ernment should do when it captures a person known to be 
planning a terrorist attack when that knowledge is based on 
solid, reliable evidence that cannot be disclosed. 
The preventive paradigm is thus premised on an emer-
gency situation which purportedly requires modifying or dis-
carding the normal rules of law. These preventive measures are 
grounded in a claim that when the potential risks are catastro-
phic the normal cost-benefit calculations of law do not apply.23 
Hence, while in ordinary times society generally accepts that it 
is preferable to let ten guilty persons go free than to convict one 
innocent person, some suggest that we cannot sustain that bal-
ance when the risk is that one of the ten who go free will get his 
hands on a weapon of mass destruction.24 
Preventive paradigm advocates therefore suggest replacing 
the clear rules of law applicable in normal times with a more ad 
hoc balancing approach attuned to the exigencies of emergen-
cies, in which officials may undertake preventive action when 
such action is deemed the “lesser evil” because it is necessary to 
avoid catastrophic harm.25 As Professor Ruth Wedgwood 
stated: 
We tolerate multiple acts of individual and social violence as the cost 
of safeguarding our privacy and liberty, demanding that the govern-
ment meet an extraordinary standard of proof before it can claim any 
power over our person, acting with a retrospective rather than antici-
patory glance. But now the stakes seem different. . . . The deliberate 
temperance and incompleteness of criminal law enforcement seem in-
adequate to the emergency, when the threat to innocent life was mul-
tiplied by orders of magnitude.26 
Resorting to coercive preventive measures when threat-
ened with an emergency of potentially catastrophic proportion 
is not, of course, confined to the current Bush administration. 
The United States has often turned to preventive measures in 
times of war or national emergency. The post-World War I 
 
 22. Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1751, 1754, (Oct. 7, 2002). 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 25–34. 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 25–26. 
 25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITU-
TION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 34 (2006); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 751–61 (2004). 
 26. Ruth Wedgwood, The Law’s Response to September 11, 16 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. J. 8, 9 (2002).  
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Palmer raids and the World War II internment of over 100,000 
Japanese Americans are two of the more infamous twentieth 
century examples of governmental deployment of coercive pre-
ventive measures in perceived times of crisis.27 The country’s 
first war with a European power after the Constitution’s ratifi-
cation, the undeclared war with France in the late 1790s, led 
Congress to enact the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 authoriz-
ing the President to deport aliens who had not committed any 
crime but were judged to be “dangerous to the peace and safety 
of the United States.”28 Some historians have characterized 
southern secession and the attack on Fort Sumter, which 
brought on the Civil War, as forceful preventive measures 
taken to forestall the Northern Republicans gathering threat to 
the system of slavery.29 Other nations such as Great Britain,30 
Israel,31 and India32 have a long history of using preventive de-
tention in response to a perceived crisis. Preventive war in re-
sponse to a looming crisis has a long and generally sordid his-
tory in Europe.33 
Perceived emergencies are thus likely to provoke coercive 
preventive responses. Because preventive measures are so 
closely linked to emergencies, there is an inherent tension be-
tween such measures and the rule of law. Countries undertake 
these preventive measures because of perceived necessity, and 
as Oliver Cromwell once pithily put it, “Necessity hath no 
 
 27. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 989–97 (2002). 
 28. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798) (expired 
1800) (“[I]t shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time 
during the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge 
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States . . . to depart out of the 
territory of the United States . . . .”); see also Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 
577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2000)); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 
1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801). 
 29. James M. McPherson, The Fruits of Preventive War, PERSPECTIVES, 
May 2003, at 5, 5. 
 30. Cornelius P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British Ex-
perience, 6 STAN. L. REV. 238, 238 (1954). 
 31. AMNESTY INT’L, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DETENTION: DESPAIR, UNCERTAINTY AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS 2 
(1997), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE150031997ENGLISH/ 
$File/MDE1500397.pdf; Alan Dershowitz, Preventive Detention of Citizens Dur-
ing a National Emergency—A Comparison Between Israel and the United 
States, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 295, 309 (1971). 
 32. Benjamin N. Schoenfeld, Emergency Rule in India, 36 PAC. AFF. 221, 
225 (1963). 
 33. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1 (manuscript at 189).  
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law.”34 The coercive preventive paradigm substitutes ad hoc 
balancing for the relatively clear rules designed to limit execu-
tive discretion. 
This Article will address the claim that times of crisis re-
quire jettisoning legal rules in favor of ad hoc balancing. Part I 
will demonstrate that the coercive preventive measures 
adopted by the Bush administration discard clear legal rules in 
favor of ad hoc balancing and rely on suspicions rather than ob-
jective evidence. Part II will examine the claims of prevention 
paradigm supporters that ad hoc balancing is necessary in the 
new post-9/11 era in order to reach decisions that correctly 
weigh the values of liberty and peace versus national security. 
This Article will argue that discarding the legal rules that pre-
vent or limit the application of coercive preventive measures in 
favor of an ad hoc balancing test not only undermines law and 
liberty, but fails to protect our security. 
I.  COERCIVE PREVENTIVE MEASURES, THE RULE OF 
LAW, AND AD HOC BALANCING   
The constellation of tactics that form a core of the admini-
stration’s new preventive paradigm—detaining individuals who 
are believed to pose dangerous threats, rendering suspects to 
third countries where they are likely to be indefinitely detained 
and tortured, engaging in “preventive” torture or inhumane 
treatment in order to obtain information to prevent future ter-
rorist actions, and initiating war to prevent a nation from even-
tually either attacking us or transferring weapons to terrorists 
who will use them against us—all have common elements. 
Each substitutes ad hoc balancing for clear rules, makes judg-
ments based on suspicions and not hard evidence, and discards 
legal checks on unilateral decision making. These elements 
sacrifice integral components of what democratic nations have 
come to accept as the rule of law in the name of national secu-
rity. 
A. SUBSTITUTING OPEN-ENDED STANDARDS FOR CLEAR RULES 
Democratic societies have sought to restrain the use of 
state violence against fundamental human interests by means 
 
 34. Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege, 30 CAL. L. REV. 634, 
640 (1942) (quoting Oliver Cromwell, Speech to Parliament (Sept. 12, 1654), in 
5 THOMAS CARLYLE, OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES WITH ELU-
CIDATIONS 74 (1870)). 
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of clear, bright-line rules. The government may not incarcerate 
a person for violating vague rules, nor can it deny her freedom 
of speech based on an open-ended ad hoc balancing test. The 
prohibition on torture and cruel and inhumane treatment is 
absolute.35 International law has also sought to protect interna-
tional peace and national self-determination by setting forth a 
bright-line rule against non-defensive use of force.36 
The preventive paradigm favors open-ended standards and 
ad hoc balancing over clear rules. When the government acts 
preventively it requires flexibility and discretion, and it seeks 
to avoid being hemmed in by clear strictures. Moreover, gov-
ernment actions that are based on predictions or suspicions 
about future conduct are inherently less subject to clear rules 
than those based on evidence of what has already occurred.37 
Since the government asserts that coercive preventive action is 
required by necessity, the typical formula weighs the magni-
tude of the harm the government seeks to avoid versus the 
probability that the government’s action will avoid such 
harm—both of which are imponderables undefined by any clear 
rule.38 
For some, the essence of law is rules. To Justice Scalia, “a 
government of laws means a government of rules,” and a deci-
sion “ungoverned by rule” is “hence ungoverned by law.”39 To be 
sure, despite Scalia’s formulation, the law frequently employs 
open-ended balancing tests and speculative cost-benefit as-
sessments. Courts or governmental agencies frequently utilize 
cost-benefit analyses to determine which acts constitute negli-
gence or how stringent environmental and occupational safety 
regulations should be.40 And the Supreme Court has often re-
lied on balancing tests to resolve issues such as the validity of 
state laws that impinge on interstate commerce.41 But such de-
cisions are fundamentally different from decisions to attack an-
other nation, to incarcerate an individual indefinitely, or to 
employ coercive interrogation. Domestic and international law 
 
 35. See infra notes 42, 65 and accompanying text. 
 36. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42, 51. 
 37. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5–6). 
 38. Yoo, supra note 25, at 751–61. 
 39. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 40. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 
107 (1983); Thompson v. Hirano Tecseed Co., 456 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 
2006); Pennington v. Holiday Ret. Corp., 100 F. App’x 301, 302 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 41. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 
434 (2005); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
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recognize that the more fundamental the human interests at 
stake, the less appropriate are flexible, open-ended balancing 
tests. The prohibitions on torture, cruel and inhumane treat-
ment, genocide, and summary executions are absolute.42 Simi-
larly, because of the importance of the interests protected by 
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected a bal-
ancing approach for the regulation of subversive speech. In the 
1950s, the Court had employed such a test, holding that the 
gravity of the threat of communist revolution was sufficiently 
great that even a small probability that it might come to frui-
tion was sufficient to justify the punishment of speech advocat-
ing communism.43 Ensuing abuse under that standard, how-
ever, ultimately led the Court to articulate a bright-line rule 
prohibiting the suppression of speech that advocates crime 
unless the state can demonstrate that the speaker intends to 
cause violence and that such violence is in fact likely and im-
minent.44 
The government’s use of non-coercive preventive measures 
is typically a discretionary policy decision ungoverned by a 
clear rule. Whether to deploy new detection equipment at air-
ports or seaports, how many visas to issue to foreign students, 
or whether to undertake diplomatic initiatives designed to 
make it more difficult for terrorists to obtain chemical or nu-
clear weapons are all determinations best left to political dis-
cretion. But when the state employs force against individuals 
or other nations, clear rules are an important legal mechanism 
to prevent abuses that inevitably arise from the exercise of dis-
cretion. 
The tension between clear rules and coercive preventive 
strategies is illustrated by the preventive war doctrine articu-
lated by the administration in its National Security Strategy 
and applied to justify the invasion of Iraq.45 The terrible de-
structiveness of modern warfare led the world’s leaders to con-
clude that individual nations’ use of force should not be left to 
the political discretion of national leaders using vague balanc-
 
 42. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 
16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 81-15, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 43. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501–11 (1951). 
 44. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969). 
 45. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
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ing tests.46 These leaders concluded that they needed a clear 
rule to restrain the resort to war—a rule that prohibited na-
tions’ use of force except in narrowly defined circumstances.47 
Just as legal protection for speech calls for bright-line rules 
limiting political discretion, the UN Charter articulates a clear 
rule that individual nations may not unilaterally decide to use 
force except in self-defense in response to an armed attack.48 
Customary international law broadens that self-defense excep-
tion somewhat to allow the use of force in response to imminent 
attacks.49 
The principle that individual nations may unilaterally use 
military force against other nations only in self-defense is de-
signed to discourage resort to war by creating a bright-line le-
gal rule. An armed attack is an objective fact; an imminent at-
tack involves some amount of prediction, but generally requires 
objective evidence that the attack is indeed imminent, such as 
the massing of troops at the border. As Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster stated in 1842, self-defense is permitted under 
customary international law only where the threat is “‘instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment 
of deliberation.’”50 The Pentagon’s definition of a permissible 
“preemptive attack” undertaken in self-defense echoed Web-
ster’s: “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evi-
dence that an enemy attack is imminent.”51 
The new preventive war doctrine departs from this bright-
line rule and substitutes a much more open-ended and less ob-
jectively verifiable standard. Not a single administration offi-
cial argued that Iraq had plans of an imminent attack against 
the United States or anybody else. Rather, the administration’s 
claims were based on a calculation of inevitability or probabil-
ity. For example, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
 
 46. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 136–37 (2d ed. 1979). 
 47. See id. 
 48. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 49. Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 518, 535 (2003). 
 50. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Alexander Baring, 
Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), in 2 JOHN BASSETT 
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412, 412 (1906) (quoting Letter 
from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister in 
Wash. (Apr. 24, 1841)). 
 51. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED 
TERMS 418 (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/ 
04196.html. (emphasis added). 
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asserted that rogue states’ “‘unrelenting drive to possess weap-
ons of mass destruction brings about the inevitability that they 
will be used against [the United States] or [United States] in-
terests.’”52 
The decision to launch a preventive war invariably involves 
speculation about future events and intentions, which is a 
judgment that defies clear rules. Thus, the National Security 
Strategy replaces the clear legal rule of self-defense with a 
vague and necessarily speculative balancing test in which the 
greater the threat, the less certainty there needs to be about 
the probability of the risk eventuating.53 The administration 
makes no attempt to define when a threat is sufficient to justify 
the use of force.54 As former administration official John Yoo 
recognized, the preventive war doctrine is based upon a flexible 
cost-benefit standard rather than the clear rule contained in 
the UN Charter.55 
The open-ended standard of the preventive war doctrine 
eviscerates the notion of legal rules controlling warfare, a point 
perhaps best described by Abram Chayes, the legal advisor to 
the State Department during the Cuban missile crisis.56 In ex-
plaining why the Kennedy administration refused to rely on 
preventive self-defense to justify its actions, Chayes accepted 
that the notion of self-defense included an anticipatory re-
sponse to an imminent attack.57 But to permit preventive self-
defense where there is no threatened imminent attack, he 
maintained, would mean that “[t]here is simply no standard 
against which this decision could be judged. Whenever a nation 
believed that interests, which in the heat and pressure of a cri-
sis it is prepared to characterize as vital, were threatened, its 
use of force in response would become permissible.”58 Because 
such a doctrine would destroy any clear limits on the use of 
force, Chayes argued that it would amount to a concession that 
“‘law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate 
power.’”59 
 
 52. JEFFREY RECORD, DARK VICTORY: AMERICA’S SECOND WAR AGAINST 
IRAQ 32 (2004) (quoting Richard Armitage). 
 53. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 13–16. 
 54. Yoo, supra note 25, at 735. 
 55. Id. at 730, 758–62, 787. 
 56. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 6 (1974). 
 57. Id. at 65. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting Dean Acheson, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Ameri-
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This imminent attack requirement has prompted the Bush 
administration to claim that it has merely “adapt[ed] the con-
cept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of to-
day’s adversaries.”60 Yoo and other administration officials 
have attempted to redefine imminence to shift the inquiry from 
timing to probability of harm. Yoo argues that the post-9/11 
world “renders the imminence standard virtually meaningless, 
because there is no ready means to detect whether a terrorist 
attack is about to occur.”61 Therefore, the imminence standard 
applied literally to a world of modern weaponry, rogue states, 
and terrorists “would be a suicide pact.”62 Instead of defining 
imminence as the moment when a blow is just about to land, 
Yoo would define imminence in terms of the likelihood of the 
attack occurring. Where the magnitude of the harm is great, as 
in a potential terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, Yoo 
would require a lesser probability.63 In short, the preventive 
war doctrine substitutes ad hoc balancing for clear rules. 
The problem with substituting “probable” or even “inevita-
ble” for “imminent” is that odds-making is an inherently specu-
lative enterprise. We simply cannot know whether the odds 
were five percent, fifty percent, or ninety percent that Saddam 
Hussein eventually would have obtained and used weapons of 
mass destruction against the United States or given them to 
terrorists to use against the United States. As former German 
Chancellor Otto van Bismarck once remarked in rejecting simi-
lar arguments for preventive war, “‘one can never anticipate 
the ways of divine providence securely enough for that.’”64 A 
test that requires decision makers to divine the possibility of a 
probable attack in the future contains no meaningful standard 
at all. 
 
can Society of International Law, 57th Annual Meeting 14 (Apr. 25–27, 1963), 
in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS 107, 108 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996)).  
 60. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 15. “[N]ew technology 
requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes ‘imminent.’” 
Condoleezza Rice, Remarks on the President’s National Security Strategy at 
the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html. 
 61. Yoo, supra note 25, at 750. 
 62. Id. at 756. 
 63. Id. at 753–55. 
 64. GORDON A. CRAIG, THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 1640–1945, 
at 255 (1955) (quoting Otto van Bismarck). 
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The other coercive preventive tactics employed as part of 
this new paradigm also substitute vague balancing tests for 
clear rules. Few rules are clearer than domestic and interna-
tional law’s absolute ban on torture and cruel and inhumane 
treatment.65 Yet, driven by the need to obtain information be-
lieved essential to preventing future terrorist attacks, the ad-
ministration effectively abandoned the law’s clear rule and em-
braced a totality of circumstances, ad hoc balancing test. In the 
Office of Legal Counsel’s August 1, 2002 memorandum on tor-
ture, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee not only set forth 
an extremely narrow view of what constitutes torture, but also 
argued that government employees who engage in torture 
would have a defense of necessity, based on a vague balancing 
of the likelihood that a suspect had information needed to pre-
vent a future attack and the magnitude of the potential harm.66 
The Bybee memo was consistent with the administration’s 
amorphous, ill-defined pledge to treat detainees humanely 
where “consistent with military necessity.”67 Administration of-
ficials provided an ambiguous definition for “inhumane treat-
ment,” claiming that techniques such as waterboarding, mock 
executions, physical beatings, and painful stress positions could 
be lawful “depend[ing] on the facts and circumstances” of each 
particular case.68 That approach led soldiers to complain that 
there were no clear rules for interrogations.69 
Similarly, when Attorney General Ashcroft oversaw the 
round-up of more than one thousand foreign nationals in the 
weeks after 9/11, he substituted a vague standard for a clear 
rule in order to justify holding them without charges for ex-
 
 65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000); Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 
1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, art. 4. 
 66. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, U.S. Assistant Attorney Gen., to Al-
berto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, Gen. 
Counsel to the Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 
81, 108 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
 67.  Memorandum from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to Richard Che-
ney, U.S. Vice President, et al., on the Humane Treatment of Taliban and al 
Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 
66, at 134, 135. 
 68. Editorial, Mr. Flanigan’s Answers, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2005, at A20 
(quoting Timothy Flanigan, Nominee to be Deputy Attorney General, in re-
sponse to written questions from Senator Richard Durbin). 
 69. Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, Senate Supports Interrogation 
Limits, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2005, at A1. 
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tended periods of time.70 Had those nationals been arrested 
under criminal law, prosecutors would have faced a constitu-
tional mandate to charge them immediately and to demon-
strate, within forty-eight hours before a federal judge, the exis-
tence of probable cause that they had committed a crime.71 
Before 9/11, immigration regulations contained a similar 
bright-line rule, requiring that charges be filed within twenty-
four hours of any arrest.72 Even the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot 
Act),73 while significantly expanding executive power to detain 
persons without charging them, still maintained a clear rule. 
That Act provided the Attorney General with the authority to 
detain a non-citizen for as long as seven days without charging 
them with a crime, upon certification that the authority has 
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the non-citizen is engaged 
in terrorist activities or other activities that threaten national 
security.74 Yet Ashcroft chose not to rely on the Patriot Act, but 
rather on a newly enacted regulation replacing the bright-line 
rule with a provision allowing the government in times of 
emergency to detain aliens for a “reasonable period of time” 
while it investigates the detainee.75 What was “reasonable” 
turned out to be measured in weeks and months. 
The administration discarded the clear rules relating to the 
detention of prisoners of war and instead claimed the authority 
to indefinitely detain “unlawful enemy combatants,” a term 
which remains ill-defined. Until 2001, this term appeared no-
where in U.S. criminal law, international law, or the law of 
war.76 It was appropriated from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opin-
 
 70. See infra text accompanying note 75. 
 71. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
 72. Administrative Comment, Indefinite Detention Without Probable 
Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 397, 399 (2001). 
 73. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 74. Id. § 412, 115 Stat. at 350–52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). 
 75. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2001). 
 76. Gary Solis, Even a Bad Man Has Rights, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, 
at A19; see also ABA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2003) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], 
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/109.pdf 
(describing the various forms of the term “combatants” in domestic and inter-
national law). 
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ion in Ex parte Quirin.77 At first, the government provided vir-
tually no criteria at all for defining enemy combatants. A plu-
rality of the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld upheld the 
government’s authority to detain an individual as an enemy 
combatant, but for the purpose of that case defined the term 
“enemy combatant” narrowly as an individual who was “part of 
or supporting forces hostile to the United States or its coalition 
partners” in Afghanistan and “who engaged in an armed con-
flict against the United States there.”78 After Hamdi, the gov-
ernment did not adopt the Court’s definition, but instead 
drafted vague regulations that would include as an enemy 
combatant persons who had never committed a belligerent act 
and who never directly supported hostilities against the United 
States.79 The government conceded that its definition of an en-
emy combatant would cover a “‘little old lady in Switzerland 
who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps or-
phans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-
Qaeda activities,’ [or] a person who teaches English to the son 
of an al-Qaeda member.”80 Similarly, William Haynes II, Gen-
eral Counsel of the Department of Defense, defined the term 
enemy combatant in December 2002 as a member, agent, or as-
sociate of al Qaeda or the Taliban.81 The use of the term associ-
ate harkens back to the McCarthy era’s attacks on those who 
associated in any way with the Communist Party.82 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006, enacted by Con-
gress in response to the Court’s Hamdan v. Rumsfeld deci-
sion,83 also includes a definition with no clear standard as to 
who can be indefinitely detained as a preventive matter with-
out charge in the war on terror.84 The Act defines an unlawful 
enemy combatant as “a person who has engaged in hostilities 
 
 77. 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942); accord ABA REPORT, supra note 76, at 4; Solis, 
supra note 76. 
 78. 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3, 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)). 
 79. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 
2005). 
 80. Id. (citation omitted). 
 81. Memorandum from William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of 
Def. to Members of the Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law Council of Foreign Relations 
(Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.cfr.org/publications/5312/enemy_ 
combatants.html. 
 82. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 129–53 (2003). 
 83. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 84. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600, 2601–02 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a). 
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or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a 
lawful enemy combatant.”85 The Act, however, leaves unclear 
who exactly is covered by the ambiguous phrase “purposefully 
and materially supported hostilities against the United States 
or its co-belligerents.”86 The government could claim that any 
civilian who knowingly teaches English to the son of an al 
Qaeda member is covered under the definition, despite the ab-
sence of any belligerent act or any direct support of hostilities. 
Even more standardless than that definition, the statute also 
provides that persons can be considered enemy combatants so 
long as they have been so deemed “by a Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under 
the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.”87 
This circular reasoning establishing that a person is an enemy 
combatant if the government says so provides no standard 
whatsoever. 
The preventive paradigm’s substitution of amorphous bal-
ancing tests for clear rules in all these areas invites abuse. In-
deed, the history of governmental use of physical coercion for 
pretextual reasons against disfavored minorities, dissenters, 
aliens, and weaker nations is one important reason for the 
law’s insistence on reasonably clear rules limiting the state’s 
coercive power.88 The preventive war doctrine is particularly 
susceptible to pretextual justifications. Some suspect, for ex-
ample, that the administration’s emphasis on illicit weapons 
and on the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda were pretexts 
to justify a war that the administration actually launched for 
other reasons: increasing American influence in the Middle 
East, spreading democracy, or simply demonstrating United 
States resolve to its enemies.89 That suspicion is furthered by 
the fact that for years prior to the September 11 attacks key 
administration officials, most notably Paul Wolfowitz, had ad-
 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. See id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Cf. Trinkler v. Alabama, 414 U.S. 955, 957 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (“A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to police-
men, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with 
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”). 
 89. E.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, A War for Oil?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
5, 2003, § 4, at 11; Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, 
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 15, 15–16; James P. Rubin, Stumbling into 
War, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 46, 48. 
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vocated war to get rid of Saddam Hussein.90 Indeed, after the 
war Wolfowitz admitted that the administration chose the 
weapons of mass destruction rationale for “bureaucratic rea-
sons,” as it was “the one reason everyone could agree on.”91 
Paul Pillar, the intelligence community’s senior analyst for 
the Middle East from 2000 to 2005,92 concluded that the ad-
ministration’s invasion of Iraq was not based on its concern 
about Iraqi weapon programs. In a recent article in Foreign Af-
fairs, Pillar stated that the administration’s “decision to topple 
Saddam was driven by other factors—namely, the desire to 
shake up the sclerotic power structures of the Middle East and 
hasten the spread of more liberal politics and economics in the 
region.”93 For Pillar, what was most remarkable about prewar 
U.S. intelligence on Iraq was not how wrong it was, but that it 
played so small a role in the decision to go to war.94 Pillar, in 
charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community’s as-
sessments regarding Iraq, did not receive a single request from 
any administration policymaker for any such assessment prior 
to the war.95 
Even where a government is not acting pretextually, but 
honestly believes coercive preventive measures are necessary to 
prevent a terrorist attack, the absence of clear rules creates a 
strong danger of abuse. For example, the government’s vague 
instructions governing interrogations allowed some soldiers to 
engage in inhumane tactics not simply for sadistic reasons but 
also in the course of honestly attempting to obtain information, 
as apparently happened frequently at Guantánamo and in de-
tention centers in Iraq.96 Ad hoc balancing thus provides little 
or no restraint on wrongful executive conduct, whether such 
conduct is undertaken pretextually or for sincere reasons. 
 
 90. United States Policy Toward Iraq: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
National Security, 105th Cong. 74–78 (1998) (statement of Paul Wolfowitz). 
 91. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., WMD IN IRAQ: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICA-
TIONS 13 (2004). 
 92. Pillar, supra note 89, at 15. 
 93. Id. at 16. 
 94. Id. at 17–18. 
 95. Id. 
 96. E.g., Kevin Bohn et al., FBI Reports Guantanamo “Abuse,” CNN.COM, 
Dec. 8, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/12/08/guantanamo.abuse/. 
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B. SUBSTITUTING SUSPICION FOR OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE 
Closely linked to the law’s requirement that clear rules, 
not vague standards, limit a government’s ability to use coer-
cive measures against individuals or other states, is the re-
quirement that such measures be based on objectively deter-
minable proof and not mere suspicion. Yet predicting future 
threats inevitably relies on suspicion, inference, probabilities, 
circumstantial evidence, and hunches rather than on solid, ob-
jective, and visible evidence. Professor George Fletcher at Co-
lumbia University aptly articulated the reason that democratic 
law generally forbids the preventive use of force against both 
other states as well as individuals: 
Preemptive strikes are illegal in international law as they are illegal 
internally in every legal system of the world. They are illegal because 
they are not based on a visible manifestation of aggression; they are 
grounded in a prediction of how the feared enemy is likely to behave 
in the future.97 
There are, of course, occasions when the state can use force 
to prevent a wrong that has not yet occurred: to thwart con-
spiracies or attempted attacks, or to respond to imminent at-
tacks from another nation.98 Conspiracies or attempts, how-
ever, generate some objective evidence of an agreement to 
commit wrongdoing, and the law requires some overt act in fur-
therance of the plan or some evidence of a substantial step to 
commit wrongdoing.99 In contrast, in times of emergency the 
state often claims that its preventive response cannot be lim-
ited by a rule requiring objective evidence that a crime is being 
planned and that concrete steps have been taken in further-
ance of the crime; rather, the government claims that a coercive 
response may be based on suspicion.100 
The substitution of suspicion for objective evidence can be 
seen in the administration’s coercive preventive measures: pre-
 
 97. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 134 (1998); 
see also Jane Campbell Moriarty, “While Dangers Gather”: The Bush Preemp-
tion Doctrine, Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 21–22 (2005). While the Model Penal Code 
attempted to introduce some flexibility into the concept of imminence, id. at 21 
n.112, most states have adhered to the traditional notion of imminence as 
temporally imminent, and even the states that have interpreted the language 
liberally still require that the defendant have a reasonable “perception of im-
minent harm,” id. at 21 n.111. 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51. 
 99. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), 5.03(5) (1985). 
 100. See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMER-
ICA’S PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 166 (2006). 
LOBEL_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:38:48 AM 
2007] PREVENTIVE PARADIGM 1425 
 
ventive war, preventive detention, and extraordinary rendition. 
To justify each of these tactics, the administration has pre-
sented suspicions and hunches masquerading as objective cer-
tainty. As journalist Ron Suskind reported, the war on terror 
has been guided by little more than “the principle of actionable 
suspicion,” as one former intelligence chief called it.101 “We 
were operating, frantically, in a largely evidence-free environ-
ment. But the whole concept was that not having hard evidence 
shouldn’t hold you back.”102 As Vice President Dick Cheney ar-
gued, if there is just a one percent chance of the unimaginable 
happening, we have to treat that chance as a certainty.103 
The preventive paradigm’s treatment of suspicion as objec-
tive fact was most evident in the administration’s headlong 
drive toward war against Iraq from 2002 to 2003.104 The ad-
ministration’s suspicions that Iraq was hiding stocks of chemi-
cal and biological weapons were shared by many observers, in-
cluding Hans Blix, the director of the UN Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq (known as 
UNMOVIC), whose task was to determine Iraqi compliance 
with the UN’s mandate that it destroy its dangerous weapons 
and dismantle its prohibited weapons programs.105 But as a 
lawyer and long-time diplomat, Blix viewed his mandate as 
most lawyers would: to find solid, reliable evidence to deter-
mine whether Iraq still had or was producing weapons of mass 
destruction.106 Despite his “gut feeling” that Iraq was hiding 
stocks of chemical and biological weapons, Blix had not been 
“asked by the Security Council to submit suspicions or simply 
to convey testimony from defectors.”107 “Assessments and 
judgments in our reports,” Blix felt, “had to be based on evi-
dence that would remain convincing even under critical inter-
national examination.”108 
Blix’s focus on solid evidence—evidence that would with-
stand critical international scrutiny—of whether Iraq actually 
had outlawed weapons increasingly collided with the preven-
tive paradigm’s inevitable reliance on suspicion, inferences, 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 62. 
 104. See id. at 166–68. 
 105. HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 3, 264 (2004). 
 106. Id. at 264. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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probabilities, circumstantial evidence, and hunches. As Na-
tional Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and President Bush 
argued, waiting for conclusive proof of Saddam Hussein’s de-
termination to obtain nuclear weapons was simply too risky, 
because “we don’t want the smoking gun to become a mush-
room cloud.”109 
U.S. officials repeatedly treated suspicions as if they were 
fact. Administration officials continuously asserted that they 
were not merely suspicious of Iraq, but rather that they 
“knew,” were “absolutely certain,” or had “no doubt” that Sad-
dam Hussein had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, 
had hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons, and 
was producing more of such weapons. On September 8, 2002, 
for example, Vice President Cheney stated on Meet the Press 
that we “know, with absolute certainty that [Saddam Hussein] 
is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he 
needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.”110 
On Fox News, Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that 
“[t]here’s no doubt that [Saddam Hussein] has chemical 
weapon stocks.”111 A month later, in a speech in Cincinnati, 
Ohio, President Bush again exuded certainty: “If we know Sad-
dam Hussein has dangerous weapons today—and we do—does 
it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he 
grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weap-
ons?”112 In March 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
made the astounding claim that U.S. officials not only knew 
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, but knew their lo-
cation. “We know where they are,” he told ABC News.113 
Hans Blix and his inspection team sought to find objective 
evidence to verify these claims.114 The inspectors searched al-
 
 109. RECORD, supra note 52, at 33 (citing Scott Peterson, Can Hussein Be 
Deterred?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 10, 2002, at A1). President Bush 
also said in an October 7, 2002 speech in Cincinnati, Ohio that “[f ]acing clear 
evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that 
could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” Address to the Nation on Iraq 
from Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 22, at 1754. 
 110. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 111. Fox News Sunday (Fox News Network television broadcast Sept. 8, 
2002) (emphasis added). 
 112. Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 22, at 
1752 (emphasis added). 
 113.  This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast 
Mar. 30, 2003). 
 114. BLIX, supra note 105, at 264. 
LOBEL_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:38:48 AM 
2007] PREVENTIVE PARADIGM 1427 
 
most seven hundred sites for potential evidence of prohibited 
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, including many sites 
identified by U.S. and other nations’ intelligence services.115 
Blix reported that “at none of the many sites we actually in-
spected had we found any prohibited activity.”116 
Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
after three months of intrusive inspections, including the in-
spections of all sites identified in overhead satellite imaging as 
having suspicious activity, found no evidence or plausible indi-
cation of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.117 
The IAEA concluded after extensive investigation that the 
much publicized aluminum tubes that Iraq had attempted to 
import were not likely to have been connected to the manufac-
ture of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.118 And, the 
IAEA and outside experts also determined that the reported 
uranium contracts between Iraq and Niger, cited by President 
Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address, were forgeries.119 
Administration officials’ claims that Iraq had a collabora-
tive relationship with al Qaeda were also based on suspicions, 
surmise, possibilities, and speculative, secret intelligence mas-
querading as reliable fact. After the September 11 attacks, 
Wolfowitz estimated that there was a ten to fifty percent 
chance that Iraq was behind the attacks—a probability analy-
sis based on no reliable intelligence data.120 Immediately after 
September 11, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld urged the President to 
confront Iraq.121 President Bush had the same gut feeling, tell-
ing his advisors that “I believe Iraq was involved.”122 
While the U.S. intelligence community generally correctly 
concluded that Iraq and al Qaeda had no collaborative relation-
ship,123 President Bush repeatedly claimed that Saddam Hus-
 
 115. Id. at 156. 
 116. Id. 
 117. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4714th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4714 (Mar. 
7, 2003). 
 118. Id. at 7. 
 119. Id. at 8. 
 120. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE 
OF THE WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT 147 (2005). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Staff Statement No. 15 “Overview of the Enemy,” in 4 THE 9/11 COM-
MISSION PROCEEDINGS AND ANALYSIS 441, 445 (2005) (concluding that there 
was no “collaborative relationship” between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda); 
see also S. REP. NO. 108-301, at 346 (2004) (“The Central Intelligence Agency 
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sein was “dealing with Al Qa[e]da,”124 had “provided al Qa[e]da 
with chemical and biological weapons training,”125 and that 
“you can’t distinguish between al Qa[e]da and Saddam when 
you talk about the war on terror.”126 In addition, Colin Powell 
warned the Security Council of the “sinister nexus between 
Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network.”127 
Administration officials afterwards admitted that they had 
lacked concrete facts, but argued that they needed to act based 
on possibilities, not objective evidence. Powell later admitted 
that he indeed had no “smoking gun, concrete evidence about 
the connection” between Iraq and al Qaeda.128 “But,” he contin-
ued, “I think the possibility of such connections did exist.”129 
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, recognized the limitations of intelligence. “Intelligence 
doesn’t necessarily mean something is true,” he said at a Pen-
tagon news briefing after major combat ended in Iraq.130 He 
further remarked that “You know it’s your best estimate of the 
situation. It doesn’t mean it’s a fact. I mean, that’s not what in-
telligence is.”131 In the absence of hard evidence on Iraqi pro-
grams, officials developed a “mosaic,” or a “threat picture,” and 
“connected a lot of dots from multiple sources” to form a “judg-
ment.”132 Or as Donald Rumsfeld later conceded, we “did not 
 
reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts be-
tween Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not 
add up to an established formal relationship.”); Douglas Jehl, Questioning 
Nearly Every Aspect of the Responses to Sept. 11 and Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2004, at A18.  
 124. The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2039, 2049 (Nov. 7, 
2002). 
 125. The President’s Weekly Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 140, 140 (Feb. 
8, 2003). 
 126. Remarks Prior to Discussions with President Alvaro Uribe of Colum-
bia and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1656, 1657 (Sept. 25, 
2002). 
 127. Powell’s Address, Presenting ‘Deeply Troubling’ Evidence on Iraq, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A18 (transcript of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s ad-
dress to the United Nations Security Council). 
 128. Christopher Marquis, Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking Iraq to 
Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A10 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. 
 130. James Risen et al., In Sketchy Data, Trying to Gauge Iraq Threat, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at A1. 
 131. Id. 
 132. CIRINCIONE ET AL., supra note 91, at 17 (quoting This Week with 
George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast June 8, 2003) (Condoleeza 
Rice); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2002) (Dick Cheney)). 
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act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of 
Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted be-
cause we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the 
prism of our experience on 9/11.”133 
Therefore, even if the administration was not using the 
preventive rationale as a pretext to achieve other goals, the 
administration’s substitution of suspicion for observable, verifi-
able evidence allowed real fears to distort, shade, or color the 
actual evidence so as to, in Cheney’s words, treat a very small 
possibility as if it were a certainty.134 To Blix, the administra-
tion in effect adopted a “faith-based” approach to war: the ad-
ministration “knew,” as if on faith, that Hussein was evil, had 
dangerous weapons, and was associated with evildoers like 
Osama bin Laden.135 All it needed to do was to find the evi-
dence to confirm that view. Blix analogized the administra-
tion’s approach to the Salem Witch Trials: “The witches exist; 
you are appointed to deal with these witches; testing whether 
there are witches is only a dilution of the witch hunt.”136 As in 
the Middle Ages, because people were convinced there were 
witches, “‘they certainly found them.’”137 
The substitution of suspicion for objective evidence is en-
demic to the preventive paradigm, for predictions about the fu-
ture are inherently speculative. This same substitution charac-
terizes the administration’s coercive prevention programs that 
it has used to fight the war on terror since September 11. As 
with Iraq, suspicion often masquerades as certainty. 
The extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar to Syria illus-
trates the preventive paradigm’s reliance on suspicion, often 
with draconian results. Arar, a Canadian citizen born in Syria, 
was on his way home to Canada from a family vacation in Tu-
nisia in September 2002 when he stopped to change planes at 
Kennedy Airport in New York.138 He was detained by the U.S. 
government at the airport based on information supplied by the 
 
 133. RECORD, supra note 52, at 112. 
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 136. Id. at 202. 
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Canadian Royal Mounted Police.139 The Canadian Police had 
sent a report to the United States which, based on Arar’s mere 
acquaintances with other men under suspicion of being terror-
ists, listed Arar and his wife as “Islamic Extremist individuals 
suspected of being linked to the al Qaeda terrorist move-
ment.”140 The Canadian suspicions turned out to be completely 
false. After an exhaustive two-year investigation, in September 
2006, a Canadian Commission chaired by appellate judge Den-
nis R. O’Connor concluded that Arar was never a member of al 
Qaeda or associated with any terrorist group.141 Judge 
O’Connor stated “categorically that there is no evidence to indi-
cate that Mr. Arar has committed any offense or that his activi-
ties constitute a threat to the security of Canada.”142 
Nonetheless, the U.S. Justice Department detained Arar in 
New York for two weeks, harshly interrogated him, and then 
secretly flew him to Jordan, where he was then taken to 
Syria.143 The Syrians held him in a tiny cell termed the grave 
cell, and in the initial weeks of detention tortured him.144 Over 
a year later, after concluding that Arar had no connection to 
terrorism, the Syrian government released him.145 
At the time the U.S. government rendered Arar to Syria it 
knew that it had no objective evidence that Arar was a terrorist 
or al Qaeda member.146 Nonetheless, INS officials operated as if 
they were certain that Arar was a terrorist. In deciding to de-
port Arar, the INS Regional Director determined that the evi-
dence “clearly and unequivocally reflects that Mr. Arar is a 
member of a foreign terrorist organization, to wit, Al Qaeda.”147 
Yet, according to the Canadian Commission’s Report, only 
three days earlier, Canadian counter-terrorism officials sent a 
fax to the FBI which stated that while Arar “had contact with” 
 
 139. Ottawa Must Act Now on RCMP Watchdog: Arar, CBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 
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 141. See id. 
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 144. Id. 
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suspicious individuals, the officials were “unable to indicate 
links to al-Qaeda,” and had “yet to complete . . . a detailed in-
vestigation of Mr. Arar.”148 The Commission also reported that 
the next day a Canadian official and an FBI officer spoke by 
phone and both concluded that there was insufficient evidence 
to charge Arar with a crime either in Canada or in the United 
States—a conclusion that would not have been true if they had 
clear and unequivocal information that Arar was an al Qaeda 
member.149 
Not only did U.S. officials inflate the information they re-
ceived from Canada, treating suspicion as if it were clear and 
unequivocal evidence, but they also kept Canadian officials in 
the dark about their plans for Arar. The Canadian foreign min-
istry was not initially informed of Arar’s detention, and Ameri-
can officials denied Mr. Arar’s requests to talk to the Canadian 
Consulate in New York, a violation of U.S. treaty obligations 
with Canada.150 The Canadian Commission concluded that the 
American officials kept Canadian officials in the dark about the 
plans with respect to Arar because they “believed—quite cor-
rectly—that, if informed, the Canadians would have serious 
concerns about the plan to remove Mr. Arar to Syria.”151 Even 
after Arar’s deportation to Syria, the U.S. government did not 
inform Canada of Arar’s whereabouts, and the Canadians only 
learned two weeks later from the Syrians that he was there.152 
Once the Canadians learned that Arar was in Syria, his torture 
and interrogations stopped.153 
The Arar case raises the question of why the U.S. govern-
ment would send a detained Canadian citizen whom it suspects 
may be a terrorist to Syria, a country which the State Depart-
ment accuses of practicing torture and being a state sponsor of 
terrorism, and not to Canada, the United States’ friend and 
ally. The answer lies in the preventive paradigm: U.S. govern-
ment officials must have believed that Syria would detain and 
use coercive interrogation methods on Arar to obtain informa-
tion needed to prevent future terrorist acts—information that 
could not be obtained by normal police methods used by Can-
ada or the United States. The Canadian Commission Report 
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found that, unlike Syria, Canada would not have detained 
Arar.154 Canadian officials told their American counterparts 
that they would place Arar under surveillance.155 But that 
measure obviously did not suffice for the United States; relying 
on suspicions, the U.S. government wanted to detain Arar and 
coerce him into disclosing what U.S. officials believed he knew. 
Similarly, the more than one thousand mainly Muslim 
immigrants rounded up after September 11 were detained 
based on mere suspicions, often with no objective evidence, and 
sometimes held for months before the government released 
them or deported them for immigration violations unrelated to 
terrorism.156 As one example, a Yemeni man was arrested after 
accompanying his American wife to her military base in Ken-
tucky because his wife was wearing a hijab (the head scarf that 
many Muslim women wear).157 The FBI investigators noticed 
the couple speaking a foreign language—French—and in their 
suitcase they carried box cutters which they had both used in 
their work.158 He was held for almost two months without any 
evidence ever being presented against him.159 His wife, who 
had also been detained, accepted an honorable discharge from 
the Army.160 Indeed, of the more than five thousand aliens who 
have been preventively detained in the United States since 
September 11, not one has been convicted of any terrorist 
crime.161 
An inherent problem with the preventive paradigm’s reli-
ance on suspicions and hunches about future conduct is what 
psychologists and scientists have long recognized to be a deeply 
rooted human tendency to interpret evidence in a manner that 
confirms one’s preexisting theories or beliefs.162 As early as 
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1620, Sir Francis Bacon explained this phenomenon: 
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion 
draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there 
be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other 
side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some distinc-
tion sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious 
predetermination the authority of its former conclusion may remain 
inviolate.163 
Such “confirmation bias” was certainly operative in the run 
up to the Iraq war, as U.S. officials cherry-picked and manipu-
lated the facts, exaggerating evidence supporting their position 
and disregarding contrary indications.164 As the Senate Com-
mission investigating the intelligence failure leading to the 
Iraq war observed, there was “a tendency of analysts to believe 
that which fits their theories,” and that analysts had “tunnel 
vision,” meaning that they “simply disregarded evidence that 
did not support their hypotheses.”165 
Senior intelligence official Paul Pillar suggests that intelli-
gence analysts and policymakers seeking to tie an individual or 
government to terrorism face other common biases and difficul-
ties.166 Finding a tie between a particular government or indi-
vidual and a terrorist organization is particularly subject to 
bias because 
[i]n the shadowy world of international terrorism, almost anyone can 
be “linked” to almost anyone else if enough effort is made to find evi-
dence of casual contacts, the mentioning of names in the same breath, 
or indications of common travels or experiences. Even the most mini-
mal and circumstantial data can be adduced as evidence of a “rela-
tionship” . . . .167 
Law cannot rid us of the predisposition to perceive evi-
dence through the lens of our preconceptions, nor can it elimi-
nate the other biases that affect policymakers and intelligence 
analysts. But one function of law is to create institutional and 
normative safeguards to counteract these biases. One means of 
offsetting bias is to require objectively verifiable evidence of 
wrongdoing, rather than relying on suspicions or hunches mas-
 
 163. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: 
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979) (quoting Sir Francis Bacon). 
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querading as fact. Because it substitutes open-ended prediction 
for hard evidence, the preventive paradigm opens the door to 
biases, preconceptions, and conscious or unconscious manipula-
tion of the evidence. 
C. THE ABSENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS 
The inherent tension between the rule of law and the pre-
ventive paradigm is heightened by the government’s insistence 
that executive discretion requires discarding institutional 
checks on its power—checks that are ordinarily provided by in-
dependent review. The government thus claims that its author-
ity to launch a preventive war is not subject to the UN Char-
ter’s requirement that the Security Council approve of such 
wars.168 The government has engaged in extraordinary rendi-
tions of over one hundred individuals, yet when it is challenged 
in court by Arar, or by the German citizen El-Masri, who was 
kidnapped by mistake, the administration has argued, thus far 
successfully, that its actions are shielded from judicial review 
by the state secrets doctrine, the political question doctrine, 
and other principles which counsel against judicial scrutiny.169 
In order to prevent judicial scrutiny of the detention of aliens 
after September 11, the administration promulgated another 
emergency regulation that provided for an automatic stay of 
bond pending appeal, de facto allowing the government to de-
tain aliens for more than a year before courts could order their 
release.170 And, the administration argued that any alien de-
tained abroad as an enemy combatant was not entitled to a 
hearing to determine if he was in fact a combatant, and the ju-
diciary could not scrutinize any such detention.171 According to 
the government, even U.S. citizens detained as enemy combat-
ants were entitled to only limited judicial review to determine 
whether the government facially set forth some evidentiary ba-
 
 168. See The President’s News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 255, 251 (Mar. 6, 
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Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, No. 06-1667, 2007 WL 625130 (4th 
Cir. Nov. 28, 2006). 
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sis for the detention.172 After the Supreme Court rejected both 
of these propositions, the administration nonetheless succeeded 
in pressing Congress to remove the judiciary’s habeas jurisdic-
tion over aliens detained as enemy combatants.173 
The administration’s short-circuiting of independent 
checks on executive power is related to the administration’s ac-
ceptance of vague standards and suspicions in place of objective 
evidence of clearly defined wrongdoing. For an independent en-
tity to allow the United States to take preventive coercive ac-
tion, the entity would require the government to proffer some 
objective evidence. For example, a majority of nations on the 
Security Council refused to authorize the United States-led 
preventive war against Iraq, in part because inspectors had not 
uncovered any objective evidence that Iraq was hiding prohib-
ited weapons.174 Hence, the United States had to circumvent 
the Security Council.175 In addition, it is hard to believe that 
any U.S. court would have authorized Arar’s deportation to 
Syria; therefore, the administration misled Arar’s lawyer and 
the Canadians, thereby denying Arar the opportunity to chal-
lenge his pending deportation in court.176 And when the gov-
ernment was forced by the Supreme Court to provide alleged 
enemy combatant Hamdi a due process hearing, the govern-
ment released him to Saudi Arabia rather than conduct such a 
hearing.177 
II.  BALANCING LIBERTY, PEACE AND SECURITY   
The argument for coercive preventive measures is based on 
a purported trade-off between liberty and security. Proponents 
of the preventive paradigm contend that the normal rules of 
law are too heavily weighted in favor of liberty to be useful in a 
national emergency or crisis. Supporters of supplanting those 
rules, such as Richard Posner, argue that when an emergency 
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arises, “cases involving a clash between liberty and safety can-
not yet be governed by rules.”178 The new terrain created by the 
September 11 attacks, they argue, makes it more sensible for 
both the executive and the courts “to govern by standard,” al-
lowing decision makers to employ ad hoc balancing to reach a 
more optimal, flexible balance between the protection of liberty 
and the requirements of security—at least until they gain more 
experience dealing with the new terrorist threat.179 Accurate 
balancing requires decision makers to accept less certainty in 
this new situation than the legal rules require and to pay more 
attention to an evaluation of the competing risks involved.180 
The argument that the post-9/11 threat requires us to jetti-
son the legal principles that have hitherto been deemed essen-
tial to constitutional and international law inevitably starts 
with the claim that we now face a novel situation which repre-
sents a dramatic departure from the context of past emergen-
cies or crisis. President Bush has argued that we have entered 
a “new world,”181 that “we face a threat with no precedent,”182 
and that the war against terrorism has ushered in a new para-
digm which requires “new thinking.”183 In the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, government officials, judges, the media, 
and academics emphasized this “new paradigm” confronting 
the United States.184 
The mentality that we have entered a “new era,” and must 
adopt a “new paradigm,” because “everything has changed” 
may hinder reasonable balancing of liberty and security. First, 
the perception of a new, unprecedented situation leads to the 
belief that historical experience and lessons—often encapsu-
lated in legal rules—now can be safely ignored. Posner argues 
that the civil libertarians are fundamentally misguided “in 
their assumption that the past is a good guide to the fu-
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ture . . . . The past does not include attacks on the United 
States by terrorists wielding nuclear bombs [or] dirty bombs . . . 
[T]he future may well include such attacks.”185 Posner also 
surmises that civil libertarians “are looking backward rather 
than forward.”186 History, according to Posner, is irrelevant.187 
Likewise, the administration’s argument for preventive 
war asserts that past experience, as encapsulated in the norms 
of international law, is not a relevant guide for balancing the 
interests of world peace and national security in the post-9/11 
world.188 The administration believes that this new threat 
“without precedent” makes our historical rejection of preventive 
war doctrine irrelevant to the present situation.189 
The legal rules that preclude preventive war, “preventive” 
torture, and indefinite and prolonged preventive detention all 
encapsulate the bitter lessons of historical experience. The sor-
did American experience with preventive detention in the 
twentieth century suggests that generally such detentions nei-
ther safeguard security nor ensure our liberty.190 It is obvious 
in hindsight that these disastrous experiences with preventive 
detention were unnecessary to protect security; and even at the 
time, some informed observers argued that the policies were 
flawed and unnecessary. None other than FBI Director J. Ed-
gar Hoover, a man not generally known as a civil libertarian,191 
argued against the Japanese internment camps, claiming that 
the FBI had sufficient capacity using traditional law enforce-
ment surveillance to ferret out and charge any potential Japa-
nese American saboteurs and spies.192 
Just as the domestic use of preventive detention to pre-
empt perceived threats has a troubled history, the use of pre-
ventive war to preempt new dangers before they occur has of-
ten had calamitous consequences. The history of western 
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civilization is filled with major wars commenced for preventive 
reasons: Sparta’s declaration of war against Athens commenc-
ing the Peloponnesian War,193 Carthage’s preemptive attack on 
Rome,194 the preventive war Germany declared against Russia 
that initiated World War I,195 and Japan’s surprise attack on 
the American fleet at Pearl Harbor,196 to name just a few of the 
more notable examples. As political scientist David Hendrick-
son observes, “Repugnance for preventive war became deeply 
embedded in the world community because the use of that doc-
trine in the twentieth century led to results nearly fatal to civi-
lization.”197 
The generally disastrous history of preventive war is not 
confined to the twentieth century. According to one study, vir-
tually all of the major wars in Europe between the sixteenth 
and twentieth centuries were motivated by prevention; typi-
cally a powerful but declining state “engaged in a desperate 
race against time”198 to defeat a growing new danger which, it 
perceived, would inevitably overwhelm it.199 Another study con-
cludes that between 1848 and 1918, “[e]very war between Great 
Powers . . . started as a preventive war, not as a war of con-
quest.”200 All but one “brought disaster on their originators.”201 
Yet another analysis of centuries of European warfare finds 
that “[p]reventive logic . . . is a ubiquitous motive for war.”202 In 
1760, Edmund Burke concluded that the military policy of pre-
venting emerging new threats to the balance of power had been 
the source “of innumerable and fruitless wars” in Europe.203 
One prominent scholar of the history of warfare concluded after 
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an exhaustive study that the “chief source of insecurity in 
Europe since medieval times . . . lies in [nations’] own tendency 
to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with coun-
terproductive belligerence.”204 Another scholar of warfare, Co-
lumbia Professor Robert Jervis, surveyed the historical record 
and concluded that, “[o]n balance, it seems that states are more 
likely to overestimate the hostility of others than to underesti-
mate it.”205 
The argument that we should abandon the rules restricting 
the use of coercive preventive measures because we are now 
facing a new world with terrorists capable of possessing and us-
ing weapons of mass destruction ignores the fact that these 
rules emerged, at least in part, from our experience addressing 
perceived new and dangerous threats. States have often argued 
that the threat they faced was new or unprecedented to justify 
uses of coercive preventive measures.206 These arguments date 
back to ancient times, when Spartans debated whether to 
launch the disastrous Peloponnesian War because of the “com-
pletely different” threat from Athens.207  
Similarly, the development of atomic weapons created a 
new, unprecedented threat after World War II that led many 
Americans to advocate preventive war, arguing that the Soviet 
nuclear threat created a fundamentally new international envi-
ronment in which the normal rules could no longer apply.208 
Fortunately, American leaders from Truman to Kennedy re-
jected these arguments.209 So too the experience with the World 
War II roundup of Japanese Americans was justified as a re-
sponse to a very real, brand new, and qualitatively different 
threat: the first significant attack by a foreign power on U.S. 
soil in over a century, and the first to use the new technology of 
air power capable of striking the United States in a fraction of 
the time foreseen by the framers.210 Congress enacted the Non-
Detention Act of 1971 to ensure that such preventive deten-
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tions of U.S. citizens would not occur in response to any future 
real or imagined new threat.211 In short, new threats, a 
changed world, and new paradigms are nothing new, and the 
rules of law reflect the lessons of our experience in responding 
to such new threats. 
While this history cannot definitively prove that preventive 
war and preventive detention are always counterproductive, it 
certainly suggests that we ought to be cautious about replacing 
the relatively clear rules of law with the ad hoc balancing test 
of the coercive preventive paradigm. Modern social science re-
search also demonstrates the need for skepticism about asser-
tions that the threat of a catastrophic attack requires that we 
abandon rules limiting government discretion and adopt a pure 
cost-benefit balancing test.212 If as a rule, people rationally cal-
culate the risk of catastrophic harm and counterbalance the 
risk of using coercive preventive measures mistakenly, we 
might be able to discard the bright-line rules that guard 
against emotional and irrational decision making.213 But it 
makes little sense to do so if emotion typically prompts people 
to exaggerate the risk of catastrophic harm, and therefore to 
tolerate many more false positives than any rational calcula-
tion would permit.214 In addition, engaging in ad hoc balancing 
in emotionally laden crisis situations is likely to undervalue the 
potential costs of coercive preventive action, because people 
tend to consider only the short term, highly vivid and accessible 
costs, while ignoring the dangers that are more abstract.215 
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Widespread preventive detention without adequate safeguards, 
for example, creates numerous risks generally: some detainees 
will be radicalized by their treatment and will become terrorist 
sympathizers, the Arab and Muslim communities in the United 
States will grow distrustful and be less likely to cooperate in 
tracking down terrorists, and al Qaeda will use our actions to 
recruit more terrorists.216 If one could rationally calculate the 
total costs, one might find out that such preventive detention 
may very well increase the risk of a terrorist attack instead of 
reducing it. 
Psychological studies highlight the difficulties in rationally 
balancing these costs and benefits. Decision making is often 
based on emotive, affect-based mental processes, which tend to 
diverge from rational cognitive assessments of risk.217 When 
faced with a potential catastrophe that has a small chance of 
eventuating, people tend either to ignore the risk or to exagger-
ate it.218 At times, to be sure, we may discount risks that would 
warrant more forceful action.219 Particularly where worst case 
scenarios evoke vivid, emotion-laden images of recent events, 
however, people are much more likely to overreact.220 As Uni-
versity of Chicago Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, “worst-
case scenarios have a distorting effect on human judgment, of-
ten producing excessive fear about unlikely events.”221 
Three phenomena particularly distort the rational cost-
balancing equation proposed by the preventive paradigm. The 
first is that humans react more emotionally to perceived new 
situations than to things they have already experienced.222 Our 
affective systems are much more sensitive to situations that 
appear to be new, but they adapt readily to ongoing or repeated 
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stimuli.223 In contrast, the deliberative system is much more 
aligned to “ongoing, stable situations.”224 As a result, when we 
face what is widely perceived to be a new, qualitatively differ-
ent terrorist threat—as occurred after September 11—we are 
much more likely to emotionally overreact rather than ration-
ally balance costs and benefits. 
Second, emotions are highly attuned to visual imagery; 
such images skew cost-benefit balancing.225 Terrorist incidents 
are likely to prompt what Sunstein terms “probability neglect,” 
the tendency to overreact to small risks of catastrophic 
harms.226 The aftermath of the September 11 attacks demon-
strated the propensity of emotions that are activated by an 
immediate, vivid, and potentially catastrophic situation to ex-
aggerate risks. A study conducted a few weeks after 9/11 found 
that the average person believed that he or she faced a twenty 
percent chance of being personally hurt in a terrorist attack 
within the next year.227 This risk perception was seriously ex-
aggerated. Indeed, individuals would not have faced that high a 
risk even if a terrorist attack of the same magnitude as the 9/11 
attacks took place every day for an entire year.228 
Similarly, when people were asked how much they would 
pay for flight insurance to cover losses resulting from terror-
ism, they agreed to pay more than when asked what they 
would pay for flight insurance to cover losses from all causes.229 
This patently irrational result can be explained by the fact that 
asking about terrorism evokes vivid images of disaster, leading 
people to overestimate the risk.230 Canadians, cognizant of re-
cent vivid examples of persons afflicted with the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome virus in their country, evaluated their 
risk of contracting the disease as much higher than did Ameri-
cans, despite the fact that citizens of both nations faced statis-
tically similar risks.231 In short, when vivid visual images trig-
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ger strong emotions, people tend to overestimate the danger of 
small, disastrous risks.232 As Sunstein argues, 
In the context of terrorism, the implication is clear. The risks associ-
ated with terrorist attacks are highly likely to trigger strong emo-
tions, in part because of the sheer vividness of the bad outcome and 
the associated levels of outrage and fear. It follows that even if the 
likelihood of an attack is extremely low, people will be willing to pay a 
great deal to avoid it.233 
Studies confirm that people will overestimate the risk of 
danger when their emotions are triggered. In one study, people 
were informed that radon and nuclear waste in the foundation 
of their homes presented similar risks of cancer, but they re-
ported an exaggerated risk with respect to the nuclear waste 
because they were angry about the source of the threat.234 In 
another study, people repeatedly judged the risks of an activity 
based on whether they had positive or negative feelings about 
it, irrespective of its actual risk.235 When they felt positive 
about an activity, they interpreted its risks as low and its bene-
fits as high.236 If they felt negative about the activity, they 
judged its risks as high and its benefits as low.237 In fact, risk 
and benefit are often positively correlated.238 Many risky activi-
ties have substantial benefits and many activities that are not 
risky at all have virtually no benefit, but people routinely sub-
stitute their feelings about an activity for a rational calculation 
of its risks and benefits.239 
These studies suggest that emotional issues such as terror-
ism will inevitably skew policymakers’ application of ad hoc 
analysis based on worst-case scenarios. Individuals and politi-
cal leaders will be unable to rationally assess the dangers and 
benefits of coercive preventive policies. Moreover, to the extent 
that the costs of these policies tend to be borne in the future, 
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and are intangible and abstract—such as the costs associated 
with undermining the rule of law—those costs will be under-
valued.240 The resulting cost-benefit analysis will inevitably be 
distorted in favor of taking coercive preventive action, even 
when rational consideration demonstrates that the costs out-
weigh the benefits. 
Of course, government officials do not always overestimate 
threats and risks in times of crisis. Indeed, social science posits 
that where a threat has no new vivid, visual example, people 
tend to ignore it.241 Global warming and the rise of fascism in 
Germany are historical examples of that tendency.242 However, 
where there is a visually vivid, outrageous, and immediate 
threat, decision makers generally overreact to the detriment of 
both liberty and security.243 
Third, and potentially even more problematic, the risks 
posed by terrorist threats are often not quantifiable at all. In-
surance experts and psychologists distinguish between “risk,” a 
probability that is capable of being estimated, and “uncer-
tainty,” a probability that is unquantifiable.244 Terrorist threats 
generally fall in the latter category.245 Because of the difficulty 
of estimating risk of catastrophic harm, the private insurance 
market would not provide insurance against terrorism at rea-
sonable rates.246 Consequently, Congress enacted the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which in effect requires the public 
to insure the insurers against calamitous losses from a terrorist 
attack.247 
Cost-benefit advocates such as Posner and Yoo recognize 
that cost-benefit analysis in this context is purely subjective. 
Posner admits that in the present setting “risks and harms 
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cannot be measured,”248 and that assessing the relevant needs 
and dangers of preventive detention is a subjective process that 
“requires a weighing of imponderables.”249 Ironically, Yoo ad-
mits the difficulties of balancing costs and benefits in his cri-
tique of the Hamdi plurality’s reliance on the Mathews v. El-
dridge balancing test250 to weigh the citizen’s interest to be free 
from involuntary confinement against the government’s na-
tional security interest.251 Yoo argues that “[i]t is difficult to 
understand how the Mathews test can be applied with any seri-
ous coherence.”252 
Should a court gauge the government’s interest in protecting the na-
tional security by multiplying the number of lives potentially saved by 
the reduction in the probability of an attack—factoring in the uniform 
value of a life as measured by the Environmental Protection Agency? 
And how should the government measure the individual liberty inter-
est in not being detained—as the average price that an average citi-
zen would pay per hour to avoid detention? If these efforts to 
monetize the prongs of the Mathews test seem silly, it may be because 
there is no systematic, rational way to quantify these competing val-
ues.253 
But if judges cannot rationally weigh these competing in-
terests, why should executive officials be able to do so? Yoo’s 
argument proves too much: it suggests that the elaborate bal-
ancing facade of the preventive paradigm really masks emo-
tional decision making based on fears, hunches, and intuitions, 
rather than costs and benefits. 
This critique of the use of ad hoc balancing to decide 
whether coercive preventive measures are warranted prompts 
several objections. First, virtually all legal rules involve some 
sort of balancing, and therefore one cannot escape the problem 
of attempting to balance competing values and costs simply by 
relying on purportedly clear rules. There are almost always ex-
ceptions to the supposed clear rules, and whether the excep-
tions should apply in any particular case requires the decision 
maker to balance competing interests and costs. 
While it is true that legal decision making generally in-
volves some sort of balancing, the existence of fairly clear rules 
and the need to present objective evidence provide checks, re-
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straints, and presumptions to guide our decisions. Law cannot 
rid us of our predispositions, emotional biases, or our exagger-
ated fears, but adopting and attempting to follow clear rules 
can provide a counterbalance to these emotional reactions. In 
that sense, legal rules help us balance correctly, by imposing a 
test which reflects a balance articulated by our deliberative 
processes before a crisis hits for one more likely to be influ-
enced by emotional reactions in the immediate aftermath of a 
crisis.254 Ironically, the need for clear legal rules is greatest pre-
cisely when the crisis seems to demand discarding them.255 
For example, the rule that only the Security Council, and 
not individual or ad hoc groups of nations, can launch or au-
thorize preventive wars does not absolutely remove the need for 
balancing a particular threat against the dangers of warfare. 
The rule does, however, reflect a strong substantive presump-
tion that such wars are undesirable, and it imposes the proce-
dural check that the decision be made by an international body 
composed of countries which may have a less emotional stake 
in going to war.256 Similarly, the absolute prohibition against 
torture may not prevent a military officer from disobeying the 
law and torturing a prisoner if he strongly believes that thou-
sands of lives are imminently threatened by a ticking bomb and 
can be saved by coercive interrogation. This type of balancing, 
however, must be informed by the fact that the officer is acting 
unlawfully and is subject to criminal prosecution for his ac-
tions. That the criminal law imposes a serious penalty for 
faulty balancing will presumably act as a substantial restraint 
on the officer. In contrast, ad hoc balancing under vague stan-
dards imposes virtually no legal restraints on decision makers. 
Another objection to maintaining clear rules during crisis 
concedes that exaggerated fears during a crisis may skew deci-
sion making, but argues that nonetheless the elevated risk of 
harm warrants a modification of the legal rules that apply in 
non-emergency periods. That people may have an exaggerated, 
emotional response to a new threat does not necessarily mean 
 
 254. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 212, at 105–106. 
 255. See id.  
 256. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (permitting individual nations to act in self-
defense in response to an armed attack); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our 
Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the In-
ternational Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002) (describing the UN prohi-
bition on the use of force). 
LOBEL_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:38:48 AM 
2007] PREVENTIVE PARADIGM 1447 
 
that the new threat does not create new risks which justify 
changing the status quo. 
I do not argue that emergencies never require reevaluating 
or modifying legal rules to meet new situations; I merely con-
tend that we should not abandon legal rules for ad hoc decision 
making whenever a new crisis hits. Of course we should always 
evaluate the legal rules in the context of a complex and chang-
ing environment. For example, prior to September 11, interna-
tional law did not clearly define non-state terrorist attacks as 
armed attacks that would accord the victim state a right of self-
defense.257 After September 11, NATO unequivocally, and the 
UN Security Council more ambiguously recognized such a right 
of self-defense.258 A new threat may require some modification 
of the legal rules, but policymakers should avoid discarding the 
relevant legal rules in favor of ambiguous standards and ad hoc 
balancing tests simply because we face a new crisis. 
Second, despite the increased risk of harm in times of 
emergency, we should be skeptical about proposals made in the 
heat of crisis to significantly modify the rules developed prior to 
the crisis. Many of the existing rules were not developed simply 
for “normal” times but were explicitly based on experience with 
past crises and with prior arguments that new conditions re-
quired coercive measures. For example, Congress enacted the 
Non-Detention Act of 1971 prohibiting preventive detention of 
U.S. citizens unless explicitly authorized by congressional stat-
ute because it wanted to ensure that what happened to Japa-
nese American citizens during World War II would not occur in 
any future war.259 Congress enacted the law to deal with war-
time and other national emergency conditions because it con-
cluded—based on historical experience—that despite the in-
creased dangers of wartime, executive preventive detention was 
not warranted unless explicitly authorized by Congress.260 We 
should not discard that calculation simply because we are now 
experiencing dangers that differ from those we have faced in 
the past. Shouldn’t we trust the balance that Congress thought 
should apply in wartime when it studied the problem in a non-
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crisis situation, rather than the balance which seems to make 
sense in the immediate and emotional aftermath of the crisis? 
At a minimum, we should be skeptical of claims to modify pro-
tections intended to apply in wartime, simply because there is a 
new wartime crisis. So too, the international community and 
U.S. Senate concluded that torture and cruel and inhumane 
treatment could never be justified—even during wartime and 
emergencies.261 We should not discard or modify that legal 
principle, even if the risk of harm is now greater because of the 
September 11 attacks, because countries dispassionately and 
explicitly considered the elevated risk of harm during war and 
emergency when they drafted and ratified the Geneva Conven-
tions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the Convention against Torture. None of those treaties 
permit torture in times of war or emergency, even though their 
drafters undoubtedly recognized that in such situations, the 
necessity to obtain information would be much greater than in 
peacetime or non-emergency periods. We should not modify 
that rule because decision makers might reach a different 
judgment in the immediate emotional aftermath of a crisis; 
both history and social science ought to make us suspicious of 
judgments reached in crisis situations that are so fundamen-
tally at odds with the rules people thought ought apply to war-
time situations before the crisis eventuated. 
There are, of course, occasions when it is appropriate for 
the government to take strong, coercive measures. But in al-
most all of these situations the law permits the government to 
take forceful action. For example, Condoleezza Rice and Donald 
Rumsfeld maintain that “millions are dead because Britain and 
France failed to take preventive military action to thwart the 
gathering Nazi threat in the 1930s.”262 But at that time, legal 
rules permitted those countries to take military action that 
would have stopped Hitler before he could have obtained the 
military power he did. When Hitler attacked the Rhineland, 
Austria, or Czechoslovakia, Britain and France could have re-
sponded in collective self-defense to those attacks without the 
need to resort to any doctrine of preventive war. What pre-
vented them from doing so was not international law, but 
rather the lack of political will to prepare militarily and forge a 
strong alliance with the Soviet Union to counter Hitler’s at-
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tacks.263 Indeed, Winston Churchill unsuccessfully advocated 
the formation of a strong defensive alliance with the Soviet Un-
ion and military preparation, and not the initiation of preven-
tive war with Germany.264 
Of course, there are hypothetical situations where policy-
makers may deem coercive preventive measures necessary to 
prevent catastrophic harm—as in torture and the ticking bomb 
scenario—but the legal rules simply prohibit executive officials 
from taking such action. However, real cases that present these 
dilemmas are likely to be rare, and as I and other scholars have 
written, it is better to force the executive official to violate the 
law openly and seek either indemnification or ratification, or 
accept punishment for his actions, than to permit officials to 
have the legal authority to engage in torture, preventive deten-
tion, and preventive war whenever they deem these measures 
necessary.265 To provide officials with the legal authority to 
take such measures when, in their opinion, emergency so re-
quires is to take us down the path to normalizing those meas-
ures. 
  CONCLUSION   
It is not surprising that governments often respond to an 
emergency or crisis by resorting to coercive preventive meas-
ures. When a danger becomes potentially catastrophic, it seems 
to make sense to take strong, aggressive preventive measures 
to avoid the danger from eventuating. Similarly, the tendency 
of governments to substitute ad hoc balancing for clear rules in 
determining which actions to take to resolve a crisis is not irra-
tional. Discarding the clear rules affords government officials 
more discretion to take the preventive measures they deem 
necessary to meet the crisis. 
Yet ironically, the turn toward coercive preventive meas-
ures may heighten instead of diminish the risk of the catastro-
phic danger occurring. In the heat of the crisis, the government 
will often fail to accurately consider the risks of the preventive 
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action—risks that not only will imprison innocent people un-
necessarily, but that these preventive measures will induce a 
reaction that will threaten the very security interests the gov-
ernment seeks to protect. 
The Iraq war presents a vivid illustration of these dangers. 
A war that was waged ostensibly to prevent terrorists from ob-
taining access to weapons of mass destruction has created a 
terrorist haven in Iraq where none existed before the war.266 
The war has spawned a breeding ground for terrorists in Iraq, 
inspired more terrorists throughout the world, embroiled the 
U.S. Armed Forces in a seemingly unwinnable conflict, and 
emboldened other nations such as North Korea and Iran to ac-
celerate their efforts to produce nuclear weapons.267 An April 
2006 classified National Intelligence Estimate concluded that 
the Iraq war “has made the overall terrorism problem 
worse.”268 Similarly a report by Britain’s top intelligence and 
law enforcement officials concluded that “[e]vents in Iraq are 
continuing to act as motivation and a focus of a range of terror-
ist related activity in the U.K.”269 
The Iraq war as well as the other coercive preventive meas-
ures the Bush administration has employed in its war on ter-
rorism thus stand as a cautionary note to those who seek to 
rely on ad hoc balancing of competing interests instead of clear 
rules to decide to preventively detain individuals, to preven-
tively use coercive interrogation methods to gain information, 
or to wage preventive war against other nations. Such preven-
tive actions are often justly condemned by civil libertarians as 
undermining our liberty and other values such as peace. Unfor-
tunately, their use can often undermine our security as well. 
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